It was in March of 1999 that I got the call from Louis Schweitzer, CEO of Renault, asking me if I would be willing to go to Tokyo to lead a turnaround at Nissan, the struggling Japanese motor giant. The two companies had just agreed to a major strategic alliance in which Renault would assume $5.4 billion of Nissan’s debt in return for a 36.6% equity stake in the Japanese company. The combined company would be the world’s fourth largest carmaker. On paper, the deal made sense for both sides: Nissan’s strength in North America filled an important gap for Renault, while Renault’s cash reduced Nissan’s mountain of debt. The capabilities of the two companies were also complementary: Renault was known for innovative design and Nissan for the quality of its engineering.

A version of this article appeared in the January 2002 issue of Harvard Business Review.